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Abstract
Since the early 1980’s, many countries have implemented electricity sector reforms. Many of
these reforms have unbundled the generation, transmission, distribution, and supply activities
of the sector and introduced competition in generation and supply. An increasing number of
countries are also adopting incentive regulation to promote efficiency improvement in the
natural monopoly activities - transmission and distribution. Incentive regulation almost
invariably involves benchmarking or comparison of actual vs. some reference performance.
This paper reviews the main approaches to incentive regulation and discusses various
benchmarking methods. We also present the findings of a survey of the use of benchmarking
methods in the OECD and few other countries. Our survey finds a variety of methods used by
the electricity regulators although with a notable preference for the non-parametric methods.
We then draw conclusions based on the findings of the survey highlighting the main
outstanding issues and lessons for best practice implementation of benchmarking in electricity
regulation.
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1. Introduction
Since the late 1980s, a wave of reform has transformed the institutional framework,
organisation, and operating environment of the infrastructure industries including that of the
electricity sectors in many developed and developing countries.2 In addition, a number of
other countries are either implementing or evaluating some form of power sector reform.
Although the structure of the power sectors and the approaches to reform vary across the
countries, the main objective is to improve the efficiency of the sector.
The main feature of many power sector reforms is the market-orientation of their approaches
to achieve the efficiency objective by using the discipline of the product and capital markets
to achieve allocative and internal efficiency through the price mechanism, competition, and
privatisation (see Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). These reforms generally involve introduction of
competition into electricity generation, design of organised power markets, and unbundling of
the electricity generation, transmission, distribution, and supply (or retailing) activities. Other
power sector reforms have also involved ownership transfers and privatisation of the existing
assets (see Joskow, 1998).
Most power sector reforms initially focus on the introduction of the price mechanism and
competition in generation and supply of electricity while the transmission and distribution
functions are, due to their natural monopoly character, less affected. As reforms in the
competitive segments progress they call for regulatory reform of the non-competitive
activities. Regulation of public utilities has traditionally been justified on the grounds of
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2public interest and natural monopoly characteristics of their industries (Priest, 1993). The
dominant mode of utility regulation has been in the form of public regulation.3 Some such as
Littlechild (2000), view regulation as a necessary but temporary arrangement until effective
deregulation involving competing private firms can be introduced.
The aim of the regulatory reforms is to provide the utilities with incentives to improve their
investment and operating efficiency and to ensure that consumers benefit from the efficiency
gains. In the US, incentive regulation is often termed as Performance Based Regulation
(PBR). A related aspect of regulatory reform is that of regulatory governance which
emphasises the formal status of the regulator and rules of conduct in carrying out their duties
and exercising power (see ACCC, 1999; Newbery, 1999; Stern and Holder, 1999; Levy and
Spiller, 1994; Berg and Jeong, 1991).
The recent interest in incentive regulation is not due to new contributions from economic
theory. Rather, the need for practical solutions has resulted in design and implementation of
regulatory arrangements that are not necessarily in line with the theory (Crew and
Kleindorfer, 1996, p. 215). The regulatory reforms have emerged as an alternative to the
traditional rate-of-return (ROR) or cost-of-service (COS) regulation of utilities and regulators
have adopted a variety of approaches to incentive regulation. A common feature among the
incentive regulation schemes is their use of benchmarking broadly defined as comparison of
some measure of actual performance against a reference or benchmark performance.
This paper reports the results of an international survey on the use of benchmarking in
incentive regulation of electricity distribution and transmission utilities. The survey covers the
OECD and a few non-OECD countries. The following section is an overview of the main
approaches to incentive regulation used by the electricity regulators. Section 3 reviews the
benchmarking techniques used in incentive regulation. In Section 4 we present the main
findings of the survey and highlight three selected cases of benchmarking. Section 5 is a
conclusion suggesting some outstanding issues and lessons for best practice implementation.
2. The Main Approaches to Incentive Regulation
ROR Regulation
The ROR regulation is the traditional approach to regulation of privately owned monopolies
and an alternative to public owned utilities. The method is a heavy-handed approach to
regulation and it is generally identified with the regulation of investor-owned utilities in the
US. The ROR regulation allows the utility to cover its operating and capital costs as well as a
return on capital. Equation (1) shows calculation of the required revenue for firm i’s targeted
rate of return in year t from projected costs.4 Alternatively, the required revenue can be
calculated from the firm’s historical costs.
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where:
RRi = required revenue OEi = operating expenses
Di = depreciation expense Ti = tax expense
RBi = rate base RORi = rate of return
The shortcomings of ROR regulation are extensively discussed in the literature and were first
presented in Averch and Johnson (1962). The main reservation against this approach is that it
does not provide incentives for cost savings and efficiency improvements but rewards over-
investments. Within the framework of the Principal-Agent theory, ROR regulation is believed
to cause a managerial slack or X-inefficiency that is attributed to the absence of competition.
In response to these deficiencies, incentive-based regulation methods such as price cap,
revenue cap, sliding scale, partial cost adjustment, yardstick competition, targeted incentive,
and hybrid schemes have been proposed. These methods are reviewed in what follows.5
Price Cap Regulation
The price cap approach to utility regulation, is perhaps the most widely discussed and
significant innovation in utility regulation and alternative to ROR regulation. The method was
first proposed in Littlechild (1983) and various versions of it have since been adopted in the
regulation of infrastructure and utility industries in the UK and other countries.6
Price cap regulation essentially decouples the profits of the regulated utility from its costs by
setting a price ceiling. The method is also referred to as the ‘RPI-X’ model. For each rate
period, normally between 3 to 5 years, the price cap for each year is set based on the Retail
Price Index (RPI) and an efficiency factor X.7 Prices remain fixed for the rate period and the
utility keeps or shares the achieved cost savings. In this regard price cap regulation resembles
an ROR regulation with rate freeze or long regulatory lag. Equations (2)-(3) shows how the
price ceiling for i is set.
(2) ii Z/)XRPI1(PP 1t,it,i −+−+∗= −
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For each year the price ceiling Pt is calculated based on the previous year’s price ceiling Pt-1
adjusted by RPI minus the efficiency factor X decided by the regulator. The price ceiling may
be adjusted using a correction factor Z to account for the effect of exogenous extraordinary
events affecting the utility’s costs. The price cap Pt represents an index of the ‘n’ different
tariffs p1…pn of the regulated utility. The use of the price index often offers the utility some
degree of freedom in setting the individual tariffs. A reservation against the use of price cap
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4regulation, particularly in the US, has been that their sales maximisation incentive conflicts
with the objectives of socially desirable programmes such as those of Demand-Side
Management (DSM) measures that utilities may be obliged to implement (MDTE 1995, p. 22;
SEE 1997, p. 52).
Revenue Cap Regulation
The revenue cap method regulates the maximum allowable revenue that a utility can earn.
Similar to the price cap regulation, the aim of the regulator is to provide the utility with
incentive to maximise its profits by minimising the costs and allowing the utility to keep the
cost savings achieved during the regulatory lag. Equation (4) shows the main elements of
revenue cap regulation for a given year.8
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where:
i = authorised revenue
CGAi = customer growth adjustment factor ($/customer)
∆Custi = change in the number of customer
Xi = efficiency factor
Zi = adjustment factor for events beyond management control
The revenue cap method can also take the form of revenue-per-customer regulation in which
case CGA is equal to average revenue per customer. In the UK, revenue cap regulation has
been applied to the main transmission utility National Grid Company (NGC). An advantage
of the method is that it can be aligned with DSM measures (MDTE 1995, p. 23). However,
revenue cap regulation has been criticised for limiting the powerful incentive to increase the
sales and competition and has therefore been characterised as inefficient (Crew and
Kleindorfer, 1996).
Sliding Scale (ROR bandwidth)
In sliding scale or ROR bandwidth regulation, the utility’s allowed rate of return is
benchmarked against a target or reference ROR that lies within a pre-specified dead-band.
Schmalensee (1979) points out that the first sliding scale regulations were used in England in
the middle of the 19th century.9 During the regulatory lag, the actual ROR can vary within the
dead-band without causing rate adjustments. If the actual ROR falls outside the dead-band it
can trigger profit sharing mechanisms or rate reviews. Equation (5) shows a simple sliding
scale regulation.10
(5) ( )*1t1tt rrrr −−= −− λ
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5where:
rt = allowed rate of return for the period under consideration
rt-1= actual return in the pervious period
r
*
 = benchmark rate of return
 = sharing parameter
When the rt-1 is within the predefined dead-band the sharing parameter  is equal to zero. For
rt-1 below or above the dead-band, the sharing parameter can, depending on the extent of
deviation, take values ranging between zero and one. The sliding scale rate of return
regulation may be combined with price or revenue cap regulation.
Yardstick Regulation
In yardstick regulation the performance of a regulated utility is compared against that of a
group of comparable utilities. For example, the mean of the costs of a peer group of firms can
serve as performance benchmark. The method was first proposed in Shleifer (1985) and can
be used to promote indirect competition among regulated utilities operating in geographically
separate markets. Equation (6) shows the main elements of a cost-based yardstick
regulation.11
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where:
Pi = overall price cap for firm i
αi = share of firm’s own cost information (p=0 representing pure yardstick regulation)
Ci = unit cost of firm
fi = revenue or quantity weights for peer group firms j
Cj,t = unit costs (or prices) for peer group firms j
n = number of firms in peer group
Weyman-Jones (1995) discusses some of the complexities associated with the application of
yardstick regulation to electricity distribution utilities while Sawkins (1995) reports a
relatively functioning and well-received implementation of the method in the privatised UK
water industry. A main concern in applying yardstick regulation to electricity utilities is the
degree to which the operating environment of the firms in question and their circumstances
(i.e. major recent investments) are comparable. Another concern is the extent to which the
data may adequately be adjusted in order to account for these differences.
Partial Cost Adjustment
Another approach to incentive regulation is to link the price adjustments to changes in the
utility’s own costs observed in a reference year. The cost minimisation incentive is provided
by price periodic adjustments that are less than proportional to the actual changes in the costs.
Equation (7) shows a simple partial cost adjustment scheme.12
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where:
Pi = adjusted price Ci = the actual cost per unit
Ci* = reference cost per unit output  = sharing parameter
Menu of Contracts
The menu of contracts method is an innovative approach to reduce the information
asymmetry between the regulator and regulated firm. Under this scheme the regulator offers
the utility a menu of incentive plans with constant consumer welfare. The utility can choose
among the incentives and the flexibility in choosing among the alternatives reveals its
welfare-enhancing preferences. The revealed preferences therefore represent a Pareto
improvement (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1996). For example, a menu of incentives can be
GHVLJQHG ZKHUH WKH XWLOLW\¶V VKDUH RI SURILWV 1 RU VRPH VSHFLILHG UHZDUG LV D IXQFWLRQ RI
deviation of the X-factor (or price cap) chosen by the utility from a base value (Equation 8).
(8) 1  ¦ ;
If the utility chooses a higher X-factor than the base value it will receive a higher reward as
per equation. The major obstacles in the application of the method are the design of
appropriate scheme as they require considerable information about distribution of efficiencies
and the corresponding rewards.
Targeted Incentive Regulation
Targeted incentive schemes pursue narrower objectives than the broad incentive regulation
approaches discussed in the above. The aim of these schemes is to target specific aspects of
the operation of the utility and achieve an outcome that would not necessarily result from
broad incentive schemes. Targeted incentive regulation may be used to promote DSM
measures, environmental standards, technical efficiency, and improvement in quality of
service. However, these schemes have been criticised on the ground that they distort efficient
allocation of resources (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1986). Also, it has been suggested that
such schemes cause distortionary effects and have been insignificant in the overall operation
of the utility (Berg and Jeong, 1991).
Hybrid Schemes
The various incentive regulation methods discussed in the above are usually not observed in
pure form. Rather, practical considerations and multiplicity of the regulatory objectives often
result in using a combination of different incentive regulation methods. For example, targeted
incentive schemes can supplement the broad incentive regulation methods. Also, incentive
regulation may be combined with various profit or loss sharing schemes. As with targeted
incentive, hybrid schemes may result in inefficient resource allocation.
73. Benchmarking Methods and Techniques
The main objective of incentive regulation method is to improve efficiency by rewarding
good performance while the actual performance is measured relative to some pre-defined
benchmark. As the rewards are based on performance measurements, two key issues are the
choice of benchmarks and the techniques used to measure the performance. Regulators have
adopted a variety of benchmarking methods and techniques in incentive regulation. According
to one classification, actual performance can be measured against benchmarks that are
“linked” (endogenous) or “un-linked” (exogenous) to performance or behaviour of individual
firms (DTe 1999, p. 29). We use a somewhat different classification based on whether the
benchmarks represent the ‘best (frontier)’ practice or some measure of ‘representative
(average)’ performance.
From a regulatory policy point of view a major difference between the frontier and average
benchmarking is that the former has a stronger focus on performance variations between the
firms. The frontier methods are suitable at initial stages of regulatory reform when a priority
objective is to reduce the performance gap among the utilities through firm-specific efficiency
requirements. Average benchmarking methods may be used to mimic competition among the
firms with relatively similar costs or when there is lack of sufficient data and comparators for
the application of frontier methods.
3.1 Frontier Benchmarking Methods
The frontier-based benchmarking methods identify or estimate the efficient performance
frontier from the best practice in an industry or a sample of firms. This frontier is the
benchmark against which the relative performance of firms is measured. The main frontier
benchmarking methods are Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), Corrected Ordinary Least
Square (COLS), and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA).13 DEA is based on the linear
programming technique while COLS and SFA are statistical techniques.
In DEA the efficiency of the firms is computed rather than estimated. DEA identifies an
efficient frontier made up of the most efficient firms in the sample and measures the relative
efficiency scores of the less efficient firms in relation to these. Norway uses the DEA scores
in setting the revenue caps for regional electricity transmission and distribution utilities. An
advantage of DEA is that it does not require specification of a production or cost function.
DEA allows calculation of allocative and technical efficiencies. The latter can be decomposed
into scale, congestion, and pure technical efficiencies (Färe et al., 1985). DEA can also
examine the effect of environmental variables (Yaisawarng and Klein, 1994). DEA results can
be sensitive to the inputs and outputs in the model. The results are also sensitive to
measurement errors in the frontier firms as the efficiency scores are measured relative to the
frontier. Further, the number of efficient firms on the frontier is sensitive to the number of
inputs and outputs.
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8In SFA and COLS the relative efficiency scores are estimated rather than computed. Both
techniques require specification of a production or cost function. The UK water and electricity
regulators apply COLS to operating costs of water and electricity distribution utilities. Similar
to DEA, the COLS technique assumes all deviations from the efficient frontier are due to
inefficiency. The efficiency scores with COLS are therefore rather sensitive to the position of
the frontier firms. On the other hand, SFA recognises the possibility of stochastic errors in the
measurement of the inefficiencies. At the same time, if there are no inefficiency measurement
errors in the sample, the error assumption would result in some inefficiency being regarded as
noise. Consequently, due to the error factor, the estimated efficiency scores with SFA are
likely to be higher than those measured by COLS.
There are also partial benchmarking methods such as the method used in the study of the
distribution utilities Victoria (see UMS 1999). These methods assume separability of different
cost categories and involve comparison of firms of different scales. This may however not be
a problem for comparison of firms which have similar technologies and scale. The Norwegian
Water and Energy Administration (NVE) uses a Value Chain Model (VCM) for one-to-one
benchmarking of the state owned central grid utility Statkraft against the Swedish grid
company Svenska Kraftnät. The model makes provision for adjustment of data for operational
and environmental factors.14
3.2 Mean and Average Benchmarking
In contrast to frontier methods, benchmarking in incentive regulation can be in relation to
some measure of mean or average performance. One such regression-based statistical method
is the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method that is closely related to COLS. However, OLS
estimates an average production or a cost function of a sample of firms. The actual
performance of firms can then be compared against the estimated performance by plugging
their input, output, and environmental data measured into the estimated function.15
As discussed under yardstick regulation, the mean of the costs of a peer group of firms can
serve as the benchmark for individual firms. In this approach, all the firms in the group are
subject to the same price cap. A version of this approach is used by the National Energy
Commission (CNE) in Chile to calculate the value added for the distribution services. The
value added for a group of comparable firms is derived from a designed efficient model or
reference firm (Rudnick and Donoso, 2000; Rudnick and Raineri, 1997). In Spain, the
regulator uses model firms for specific geographical areas to allocate a portion of the total
system revenues among distribution utilities.
Also, the sliding scale method can be viewed as a form of average benchmarking in which the
target ROR in the dead-band is intended to represent a fair rate of return that is based on the
return earned by comparable industries or firms in similar operating environments. The
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9regulated utility is therefore competing with the average performance in the industry or
economy.
Another method based on average performance is to use Total Factor Productivity (TFP) as
benchmark. This method can for example use the Tornqvist index as a measure of historical
productivity growth of a firm, an industry, or the entire economy in setting the efficiency
factor X in price cap regulation (see for example ESAA, 1994). The method is relatively easy
to implement. However, less efficient firms may find it easier than efficient firms to
outperform the TFP and earn large profits. Finally, targeted incentive schemes can use
average or frontier performance benchmarks to address specific aspects of the operation of the
firms. These benchmarks may be based on the past or expected performance of the firm or the
industry.
4. Empirical Benchmarking Studies
A number of comparative performance studies have addressed efficiency aspects of the
electricity industry. Many of these studies are concerned with economies of scale and density
or the effect of the ownership form on utility efficiency (see Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson,
1998). This section outlines some selected empirical studies of relative efficiency of
electricity (mostly distribution) utilities. Most of these studies are conducted by third parties
and are not, at least directly, part of the regulatory process. The scope of most of the
efficiency studies is limited to relative efficiency in a single country while some studies have
a cross-country focus. These studies illustrate the range of benchmarking techniques which
have been applied to electric utilities.
4.1. Single-Country Studies
Weyman-Jones (1991) reports a DEA study of the 12 Area Electricity Boards (AEBs) in the
UK in 1986/87 and finds a wide divergence among the AEBs while five of these are on the
frontier. Burns and Weyman-Jones (1996) use SFA in a study of the Regional Electricity
Companies (RECs) in the UK and find a significant but small cost-inefficiency and evidence
of some economies of scale. Førsund and Kittelsen (1998) apply the Malmquist index to
measure productivity development in the Norwegian distribution utilities between 1983 and
1989 and find an annual productivity growth of 2%.
Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1998) apply DEA and SFA methods in a study of the
distribution utilities in Sweden between 1970 and 1990 and find evidence of economies of
scale, technical progress, and relative efficiency of private utilities. Hougaard (1994) in a
DEA study of 82 Danish distribution utilities in 1991 finds significant potential for efficiency
improvement. The study also shows that while the efficiency scores are sensitive to model
specification the rank orders across the four models are rather robust.
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Bagdadioglu, Price et al. (1996) in a DEA study find indication of relative efficiency among
the Turkish distribution utilities offered for private franchise. Miliotis (1992) reports an
efficiency study of 45 electricity distribution districts in Greece using DEA and econometric
methods. Filippini (1998) and Giles and Wyatt (1993) use translog econometric models for
Swiss and New Zealand distribution utilities and find economies of scale with the former
recommending mergers among the utilities.
4.2. Cross-Country Studies
Benchmarking studies almost invariably focus on individual industries of one or more
countries. Lawrence, Houghton et al. (1997) report a notable exception in the form of an
international multi-industry benchmarking study by Australia’s Bureau of Industry
Economics. The project was carried out between 1991 and 1996 and examined relative
efficiency of eight Australian infrastructure industries including the electricity sector using
indicators of price, service quality, labour productivity, and capital productivity. The
Australian electricity sector appeared to be closing some aspects of performance gap with
international comparators.
Pollitt (1995) examines the effects of the public vs. private ownership on performance
through an international comparison of electricity generation, transmission, and distribution
utilities using DEA, COLS, and SFA models. IPART (1999) reports a cross-country study
sponsored by a regulator that examines relative efficiency of 6 distribution utilities in New
South Wales, Australia using a large sample of national and international comparators.
Whiteman (1999) applies DEA and SFA to 7 Australian and an international sample of 32
electricity supply utilities and shows that X-inefficiency may have declined following the
Australian electricity reform. In addition, Meibodi (1998), Yunos and Hawdon (1997), and
Whiteman (1995) apply DEA to measure relative efficiency of the electricity systems in a
number of developing countries.
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Table 1: Single and cross-country benchmarking studies16
Author Sample Method of Analysis
IPART (1999) 219 Australian, New Zealand, England &
Wales, and US distribution utilities
DEA
Whiteman (1999) 7 Australian and in international sample of
32 utilities
DEA, SFA
Filippini (1998) 39 Swiss municipal electricity distribution
utilities 1988-91
Translog cost function
Førsund and
Kittelsen (1998)
1983-89 data on 150 Norwegian distribution
utilities
Malmquist DEA
Goto and Tsutsui (1998) 9 Japanese and 14 US electric utilities 1983-
93
DEA
Kumbhakar and
Hjalmarsson (1998)
Swedish electricity distribution 1970-1990 Translog input requirement function,
stochastic frontier framework, DEA
Meibodi (1998) Panel data of 26 LDCs (2 years). Panel data
of 30 Iranian plants (6 years) and 1 cross-
section of 30 dist. organisations.
SFA, DEA
Zhang and Bartels (1998) 32 power supply authorities in Australia, 51
power boards in New Zealand, and 173
distributors in Sweden
DEA, Monte Carlo simulation, bivariate
lognormal input distribution
Lawrence,
Houghton et al. (1997)
8 Australian infrastructure industries incl.
electricity 1991-96
Performance indicators, TFP, DEA
Yunos and Hawdon (1997) Malaysian, 27 LDCs and the UK utilities DEA
Bagdadioglu,
Price et al. (1996)
76 Turkish distribution organisations (72
public, 2 private, 2 integ. private) 1991
DEA
Burns and
Weyman-Jones (1996)
12 RECs in England 1980/81 to 1992/93 SFA using cross-sectional and panel data
Claggett et al. (1995) 74 municipals, 45 co-operatives under
Tennessee Valley Authority 1985-89
Profit function mode, Cobb-Douglas model
Whiteman (1995) Electricity systems of 85 LDCs DEA
Berry (1994) US rural electric co-operatives and investor-
owned utilities 1988 (Gen., Trans, and Dist.)
Translog cost functions for IOUs and co-
operatives
Burns and
Weyman-Jones (1994)
RECs 1973-93 Non-parametric programming of relative
efficiency, Malmquist productive indices
Claggett (1994) 157 TVA distributors 1982-89 (108
municipals and 49 co-operatives)
Standard translog cost function
Hougaard (1994) 82 Danish distribution utilities DEA
Pollitt (1994) 129 US transmission utilities (23 public,
106 private), 145 distribution utilities (136
US, 9 UK; 119 private, 26 public)
DEA and OLS
Giles and Wyatt (1993) 60 regional Electricity Supply Authorities
for New Zealand 1986/87
Translog cost model
Klein et al. (1992) US Coal-Burning Gas Plants (a selection of
plants 1975 to 1987)
DEA, Malmquist Index
Miliotis (1992) 45 electricity distribution districts of the
Greek Public Power Corporation
DEA
Weyman-Jones (1991) 12 UK Area Electricity Boards (AEBs) for
period 1986/87
Non-parametric linear programming
efficiency measurement
Twada and
Katayama (1990)
9 large Japanese electric power companies
(generation only) 1965-82
Estimate production function for marginal
productivity of factors
Charnes et al. (1989) 75 Texas electric co-operatives DEA compared with existing ratios and
regressions based systems
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5. Results of the Survey
5.1. The Survey: Purpose, Scope, and Method
The previous sections emphasised that an increasing number of countries are implementing
electricity sector liberalisation measures and regulatory reforms. We then reviewed the main
models of incentive-based regulation and discussed the main benchmarking methods that are
available to the regulators. In the wake of the regulatory reforms two central questions that
emerge are: (i) to what extent the regulators have adopted or intend to use benchmarking in
incentive regulation and (ii) what are the main features of the adopted benchmarking methods
and processes?
In order to address these questions we conducted a survey of the electricity regulators in the
OECD and a few other selected countries. In a few cases the information was provided by
academic researchers with knowledge of the industry and regulatory process. The survey was
conducted through a questionnaire containing 20 questions addressing different aspects of
power sector and benchmarking methods and processes. The focus of the survey is on the
regulation of transmission and distribution functions as the supply function is potentially
competitive. Questionnaires were sent electronically to specific individuals who in advance
expressed willingness to contribute to the survey. The recipients also received a complete
questionnaire showing an example of full response. Some of the responses were followed up
with additional questions. Several regulators who indicated no use or intention to use
benchmarking were eliminated from the survey. Consequently, this survey includes 17 OECD
and 4 non-OECD countries.
5.2. Review of the Findings
5.2.1.General Features of Power Sector and Benchmarking
Table 2 outlines the questions that form the basis of the findings presented in this paper. The
questions are organised into three categories addressing (i) main features of the electricity
sector, (ii) the adopted benchmarking method, and (iii) various aspects of the benchmarking
process. A summary of the results are given in Tables 3 and 4. The results show that
electricity regulators in several countries have adopted some form of benchmarking (Table 3).
In addition, regulators in other countries such as Denmark, Ireland, and Brazil are planning or
considering the use of benchmarking in regulation. Norway, UK, and Chile which were
among the first countries to implement market-oriented reforms have also adopted,
benchmarking in regulation of the natural monopoly segments. As shown in Table 3, other
countries that use benchmarking have implemented power sector reforms during the second
half of the 1990s.
13
The results also show that benchmarking is almost invariably conducted by independent
regulators. The notable exceptions in this regard are Japan and Chile with government
ministries functioning as the regulatory authorities. In the near future, more countries are
expected to establish independent regulatory bodies. This is particularly the case in the
European Union where the Electricity Directive has encouraged the establishment of
electricity regulators in member countries and in the countries that seek membership of the
Union. Also, the survey results indicate that countries that use benchmarking usually have or
are in the process of establishing spot markets and a high degree of end-user market
liberalisation both of which can be regarded as indicators of advanced levels of market
liberalisation and regulatory reform.
However, there is a variety of benchmarking methods adopted by the regulators across the
countries and jurisdictions within the same country such as in the case of the Australian states.
As shown in Table 2, the regulators in Great Britain, Norway, Netherlands, New South
Wales, and Colombia have used DEA in benchmarking as part of the price review process
while in Finland the method has been used outside the price-setting process. The regulator in
Queensland has replaced DEA with econometric methods. Regression based models are also
used in Great Britain (COLS) in benchmarking of operating expenditures of distribution
utilities.
The Ontario regulator uses the historical development of TFP in 47 distribution utilities.
Among the average or mean-based benchmarking methods, regulators have generally chosen
some form of yardstick regulation. In Japan, yardstick regulation is used together with ROR
regulation by placing utilities in 3 performance groups for the purpose of setting the allowable
costs and determining the rate base. Also, the Netherlands and Ontario envisage the use of
yardstick regulation in the future following transition periods during which the performance
gap among the utilities is reduced and better data is collected.
The regulators in Chile, and Spain, use theoretical or model firms in benchmarking of
distribution utilities and yardstick regulation. The model firms are designed and dimensioned
to represent efficient utilities that serve as reference or benchmark. This approach attempts to
reduce the need for and reliance on cost information from the utilities to determine the
benchmark by constructing models of efficient firms. In Chile, the representative model firms
are used in yardstick regulation of distribution utilities. The Chilean model has also been
adopted in some other Latin American countries (e.g. Peru). In Spain the model firms are used
in allocating a portion of the total revenues of the system among the distribution utilities.
In addition to the above approaches, ROR can be combined with profit and loss sharing
mechanisms and used in incentive regulation. The regulator in California uses a PBR scheme
in distribution regulation of Southern California Edison (SCE) that combines price cap
regulation with a profit and loss sharing schedule triggered by the difference between a
benchmark ROR and the actual ROR. The electricity regulator of the state of Orissa, India
uses a ROR-based reward system in a targeted incentive scheme. The utilities are rewarded
with 1 percentage point ROR above the benchmark level for each percent reduction in
transmission and distribution losses below the 35% level.
14
Nearly all regulators surveyed in this study have stated that they have full discretion with
regard to the choice of the benchmarking method, model, and inputs. In addition, much of the
implemented and proposed use of international benchmarking and performance comparisons
are related to transmission activities. Regulators in the Netherlands, Norway, UK, and
Colombia have engaged in international transmission benchmarking while the new regulator
in Austria envisages use of cross-country comparisons in the future. This can be explained by
the relatively limited number of transmission utilities in each country.
5.2.2 The Benchmarking Process
The length of the regulation lag in the countries that practice benchmarking is almost
invariably between 3 and 5 years (Table 4). In addition, nearly all surveyed regulators have
expressed at least one iteration in the process of setting prices with the industry in the form of
consultation documents or issue papers the norm being 3 to 4 iterations. One exception in this
regard is however Japan where the regulatory authority is not independent. With regards to
treatment of operating and capital costs and possible trade-offs between these, the regulators
in Belgium, Denmark, Northern Ireland, Norway, Spain, and Colombia do not separate these
costs and just use total controllable costs.
Benchmarking of service quality is mostly in terms of setting minimum standards. However,
Finland and the Netherlands have indicated their intention to include service quality in DEA
studies while in Brazil the use of Multi-Criteria Decision Aid (MCDA) for ranking of the
quality standards is under consideration.17 In Great Britain, Brazil, Colombia, and Chile, the
service quality standards are applied in conjunction with non-attainment penalties or
compensation schemes.
Countries that use benchmarking in regulation also rely on the price and revenue cap
arrangements as incentives for optimising investments. The Norwegian investment incentive
is tied to the revenue cap by offering the utilities one-half of the percentage growth in
demand. In Great Britain however, the investment incentive is based on a scheme for sharing
the achieved savings in investments. The environmental impacts of electricity distribution
activities are generally not considerable. However, it is possible to combine price or revenue
regulation with incentive schemes designed to promote DSM programmes or green energy
such as in the US and Belgium respectively.
Nearly all regulators require submission of information by the utilities in standardised
formats. This information is however subject to different audit requirements. Most regulators
rely on independent audits while others check or control the submitted information. However,
publication of information on the regulatory procedures and decisions is not necessarily an
integrated part of the benchmarking process. The most extensive public information is
provided by the regulators in the Netherlands, Great Britain, Norway, Ontario, and the
Australian states.
                                                       
17 See for example Yoon and Hwang (1995) for a review of some of the methodologies.
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Further, among the countries surveyed Norway, Brazil, and Spain indicated active research
sponsorship or joint studies and research projects. Indirect influence of academic and
empirical research on adopting of benchmarking is rather difficult to determine but have been
indicated by the regulators in Colombia and the Netherlands. However, several countries such
as Turkey, Greece, Sweden, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Denmark for which there are
independent efficiency studies do not to use benchmarking as part of the regulatory process
(see Table 1).
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Table 2: Survey questions
I. Power sector reform - general features
1. Formal status of the regulator.
2. Initial dates of power sector reform and benchmarking.
3. Regulated activities of the power sector.
4. Types of power markets.
5. Degree of market liberalisation.
6. Number and ownership of transmission and distribution utilities.
II. Benchmarking - method
7. Is benchmarking used by the regulator?
8. The general benchmarking method used.
9. Regulator’s discretion in selecting benchmarking method, model, and inputs.
10. Is international benchmarking used?
III. Benchmarking - process
11. Length of regulatory lag.
12. Number of iterations / consultations.
13. Separate handling of OPEX and CAPEX?
14. Is benchmarking of service quality used? Problems?
15. Incentives for service quality.
16. Incentives for optimum investments.
17. Incentives for environmental impact.
18. Is the required information standardised or audited?
19. Amount of information published.
20. Is adoption of benchmarking influenced by third-party studies?
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Table 3: Power sector reform and benchmarking features (abbreviations defined after Table 4)
Power Sector – General Benchmarking - Method
1.
Regulator
status
2.
Reform &
benchm. date
3.
Regulated
activities
4.
Power
markets
5.
Degree of
liberalisation
6.
Ownership & No.
Of utilities
7.
Benchmarking
in regulation
8.
Benchmarking
method
9.
Regulator
discretion
10.
International
Benchmarking
OECD –
Europe
Austria Independent
regulator
From 1.10.01
reform: feb. 1999 T, D, S balancing market full liberalisation
from 1.10.2001
T: 15
D: 300 (min. 51%
public)
under consideration tbd
-
for cross-border
tariffs (future)
Belgium Autonomous reform: 1999 T, D & S (to captive
customers (ROR) -
1999: +100 MW
2003: + 10 MW
2007: other
T: 1 (private)
D: 37 (20% of which
public/municipal
owned, 80% mixed)
under preparation, tbd full discretion yes
Denmark Independent,
subord. to Min.
of En. & Env.
reform: 2000 T, D spot market 1.1.2000: 100 GWh
1.4.2000: 10 GWh
1.1.2001: 1 GWh
T: 2 national + 13
region. (owned by Ds)
D: 120
coop./municipal.
under preparation
(planned fr. 2001)
DEA methods
prescribed by
the Ministry
no
Finland Independent
subord. to Min.
of Trade & Ind.
reform: 1995 T, D. (ROR-oriented
ex post control)
spot & forward mkt.
(Nord Pool), balancing
mkt. (El-EX)
full liberalisation
from 1997
T: 1 national grid & 10
reg. nets privatised
D: state, 71 county
/municipal., 35 private
intends to use an
efficiency model for
setting ROR
regulator has used DEA
but not as regulatory tool
large degree
of freedom
no
France independent (fr.
May 2000)
reform: 2000 T, D, S spot & balancing
market
16 GWh (1999)
  9 GWh (2003)
T: 1 (state)
D: EDF+180 DNN
under consideration
- - -
Great
Britain
 
England &
 Wales (T/D),
 Scotland (D)
non-ministerial
govt. dept.
reform: 1990
benchmarking:
RECs 1995
NGC 1997
T, D,  S spot, forward,
balancing mkt.
full liberalisation from
June 1999
T: 1   privatised
D: 12 privatised.
yes T: TFP, DEA of 40 &
survey of 15 utilities
D: COLS for OPEX
large degree
of freedom
yes. for National
Grid Company
  - Northern
    Ireland
non-ministrial
govt. dept.
privatisation:
1992/93. EU
directive 1.7.99
T, D, S bilateral contracts 1.33 GWh p.a. T/D: 1 public yes (fr. 2002) DEA and regression using
a sample of GB utilities
full discretion no
Hungary indep., subord.
to Min. of Econ.
Affairs
Jul. 2001
(expected)
all activities currently
regulated
no tbd T: 1 state-owned
D:6 75-90% private
limited some comparisons by
independent consultants
when auditing costs
large degree
of freedom
discretion of
independent
consultants
Ireland independent reform: feb. 2000 T., D., and S. to capt.
consumers (rev. cap,
X for all firms 1%
spot & forward market
for trade w. NI
28% (2000),
40% (2002),
100% (2005)
T: 1
D: 1
95% (public)
proposed - as a
contributory factor -
large degree
of freedom
COC, CAPEX,
OPEX, tech. eff.,
qual. of serv.
Italy independent reform: 1999 T, D, S bilateral (existing)
spot & forward mkt.
(fr.2001) balanc. mkt.
(under consideration)
consortia/groups of
firms w. demand p.a.
>30 GWh 1999
>20 GWh 2000
>9   GWh 2002
T: 1 national. grid
(pub.) & 13 grid
owners. D: 200 (priv.
& municip.) – Enel
(94%) u. privatisation
yes comparisons large degree
of freedom
Euro. countries and
int. firms examined
in setting X factor,
ROR, risk factor
Netherlands independent,
subord. to Min.
of Econ. Affairs
reform: 1999:
partial lib.
benchm.: 2000
T, D , S (captive
customers)
spot (APX), balancing
and bilateral contract
mkt. (near future)
full liberalisation from
2004
T: 1 public
D: 19 public region.
networks (T&D to be
part privatised)
yes DEA, yardstick regulation
after a transition period
large degree
of freedom
yes, for setting
transm. tariffs
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Norway semi-autonom.,
subord. to Min.
of Petrol. & En.
reform: 1991
benchm.: 1997
T,  regional networks,
& D (rev. cap)
spot, futures (no
physical deliv.), bilat.
cont., bal. mkt.
full liberalisation since
1995
T: 1 state
D: c.200 (77% public,
23% priv. & mix)
yes DEA for 190 D units and
90 reg. netw.
large degree
of freedom
T: w. Swedish T
(Value Chain
Method)
Spain indep., subord.
to Min. of Econ.
Jan. 1998 T, D,
S (captive consumers)
rev. cap
voluntary pool (day,
intra-daily, constraints,
ancillary ser.) &
bilateral contract mkts.
gradual liberalisation -
to be completed by
2007
T. grid 74.2% priv.
D. private (4 large and
many small)
yes theoretical efficient
model/reference firms for
revenue retribution
among utilities
discretion
-
Sweden independent,
subord. to Min.
of Trade & Ind.
reform: 1996 T, D, light handed
regulation (no ex ante
tariff approval)
spot and forward
markets (Nord Pool)
full liberalisation for all
customers in from 2000
T:1 central grid (state)
D: 20 plus 6 regional
Ts (mixed ownership)
intends to use a
GIS-based model to
compare revs. to a
benchmark rev.
the regulator has used
DEA and SFA for follow-
up but not tariff or
revenue regulation
large degree
of freedom
no
Other
OECD
Australia
  - New South
    Wales
independent reform: 1996
benchmk.: 1994
T, D
S (franchise
customers)
compulsory spot mkt.
financial contracts
between S and G
Jan. 01: 100-160 MWh
Jun. 01: 40-100 MWh
Jan. 02: 0-40MWh p.a.
T: 1 (government)
D: 6 (government)
yes DEA, TFP, SFA, industry
benchmark., partial
indicator analysis
full discretion yes, DEA/TFP and
industry
benchmarking
  - Queens-
     land
present: Min. of
Mines & En.
from Dec. 2000:
indep. regulator
reform: 1995
benchmarking:
(DEA) 1996
T, D
S (franchise
customers)
national spot mkt.,
financial contracts
July 99:  consumers w.
demand > 0.2 GWh p.a.
T: 1
D: 2
all state govt. owned
yes previously: DEA,
currently: econometric,
partial & total
productivity factors
full discretion US & Australian
distribution utilities
(T: 1996)
  - Tasmania independent 1997-98 rev. cap
& unbundling of
services
T, D
as well as G and S for
franchise customers
no competitive mkts.,
seeking to join the
national spot mkt..
-
T: 1 (state-owned)
D: 1 (state-owned)
yes independent consultant
reports
full discretion yes
  - Victoria independent reform: 1995
benchmk.:
T (nation. regul. 2001)
D (price cap)
S (max. retail tariff)
compulsory wholesale
spot mkt, contract mkt.
6o MWh p.a.,
fr. mid-2001 full
liberalisation
T: 1
D: 5
yes OPEX: statistical industry
(partial) benchmarking
full discretion yes, internat.
industry
benchmarking
Canada
  - Ontario
independent
quasi-judicial
tribunal
reform: 2000
price cap (IPI -
utilities TFP+Z)
T, D (IPI–TFP+Z) spot & bilateral mkts.
fr. mid-2001. In the
future: emissions & T
rights trading
-
T: 1 province-owned
D: c.250 municip., 1
province, 4 priv.
owned
yes 2000-02: hist. dev. Of
TFP for 47 utilities
next rate period: yardstick
regulation
discretion possible - for system
reliability indicators
in the future
Japan Min. of Int.
Trade & Ind.
reform: 1995 –
gen./wholesale
benchm.: 1995
T, D, & low-volume
retail (ROR
regulation)
-
March 2000 retail
customers w. demand
>2000kw & >20000V
10 private vertically
integrated
yes yardstick regulation – 3
perform. groups for
setting allowable
costs/rate-base
- -
United States
 
 - California
     (SCE) independent reform: 1993
benchmark: 1997
T (ROR),
D (PBR)
S (bundled customers)
spot market full liberalisation private yes ROR-base profit sharing full discretion no
Non – OECD
Brazil independent reform: 1995 T, D
S (partial)
spot market
(Sept. 2001)
- T; 15 (state-owned)
D: 65 (private)
fr. 2001 DEA full discretion -
Chile government
agency
reform: 1982
benchm.: 1986
T, D
S (captive customers)
centralised marg. cost
based dispatch pool
demand>2 MW
(0.2 MW proposed)
T: 2
D: c.35
yes yardstick regulation w.
reference/model firms
full discretion -
Colombia indep., subord.
to Min. of
Mines & Energy
reform: 1995
benchmark.:
1997
T, D,  S (captive
customers) PPI-1%
price cap regul.
spot 30%, & contracts
70% mkts. Futures mkt
(anticipated)
custom. w. demand >
0.1 MW & 55 MWh
per month
T: 12 (90% pub. /10%
priv.) D: 35 (40% pub.
/60% priv. - planned)
yes DEA for S & T
construction costs
full discretion yes, for T
construction costs
India
  - Orissa
independent reform: 1995 T, D,  S (captive
customers) ROR reg.
bilateral long-term
PPAs
- T: 1 (state)
D: 4 (state & private)
yes ROR reward for T/D loss
reduction
full discretion -
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Table 4: Benchmarking process
BENCHMARKING – PROCESS
11.
Regulatory
lag
12.
Iterations /
consultations
13.
Separate
OPEX/CAPEX
14.
Service quality
benchmarking
15.
Incentives for
service qual.
16.
Incentives for
optim. invest.
17.
Incentives for
env. impact
18.
Info. required
stand. / audited
19.
Published
information
20.
Influence of
indepen. studies
OECD–Europe
Austria
- - - - - - -
not stand. - proven
by a consultants
consulting reports 1 study by the
ministry, others under
discussion
Belgium 1 year annual 3-month long
discussions under
preparation
total controllable
costs
tbd
-
use of tot. costs in
rate-setting, project
return analysis
obligation to supply
min. 3% green energy
by 2004
std. format under
preparation,
approved auditors
initial consultation
documents and
informal meetings
yes
Denmark 4 years yes, 1-2 years total controllable
costs
no
-
tbd
-
standard reporting
format audited by
utility auditors
yes, statuary orders indirect through
consultants
Finland annual
assessments
yes DEA study of OPEX
(planned)
to be included in the
DEA study
by including
service quality in
the DEA
no no questionnaire,
some account. info
indep. audited
key technical and
financial figures
yes
France
- - - - - - - - - -
Great Britain
 England &
 Wales (T/D),
 Scotland (D)
5 years consultant. papers
T: 4 D: 2
yes no compensation, loss
of licence, fr. 2002
+/- 1% rev. reward
shared savings in
investments
no questionnaire, no
explicit audit,
some accounting
info subj. to audit
consultation docs,
& company
business plans &
submissions
no
  - Northern
    Ireland
5 years ca. 5 iterations no
- - - - -
consultation
documents and
price reviews
through consultants
Hungary 4 years
(1997-2000)
yes, ad-hoc - - - - - cost audit in
standard. format
limited to info in
annual report
limited
Ireland likely 3-5 years open consultation
intended
tbd tbd tbd based on RPI-X
model and CAPEX
assessment
tbd tbd tbd to be established
Italy 4 years
(2000-2003)
4 consultation
documents -
penalties for non-
attainment of
standards
uniform targets
after trans. period
reducing national
/intern. gap
- -
standardised (in
the future also
independent audit
- -
Netherlands 4 years
(2000-2003)
3 consultation &
guideline documents
no, total controllable
costs
from 2001 - yes - standard format &
company auditor
consultation docs.
& info meetings
New Zealand 1993
study, DEA research
Norway min. 5 years
2002-2007
1 draft and final
proposals
no
-
rev. cap from 2001 ½ of expected %
growth in delivery
added to rev. cap
-
standard format,
utility auditors,
check by regulator
utility submissions,
annual financial,
techn. reporting
joint research -
ministry, regulator,
research orgs.
Spain not fixed. current
period 1999-2002
none no tbd – standards and
compensation
tbd rev. cap linked to
productivity &
demand growth
tbd info. audited by
the regulator
unpublished research into model
networks
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Sweden
-
consultations with
the industry
has used physical
data for capital.
intends to use
replacement value
- - -
an incentive system
for renewable energy
under study
standard reporting
format, audited
annual accounts
-
indirect
Other
OECD
Australia
   - New South
     Wales
5 years several iterations yes possible in future
reviews
-
medium term caps,
CAPEX prudency
tests, optimisation
of asset base
D required to consider
DSM in lieu of
CAPEX, retailers have
targets for renewables
& GH emissions
standard format
reports, accounts
subject to
independent audit
efficiency studies,
consultant’s
reports, financial
projections
yes
   - Queensland min. 3 years issue papers / draft
determinations
O & M study &
CAPEX-OPEX
trade-offs
fr. 2001consistent
measuring of
indicators &
complaints reports
under preparation benchmarking &
DORC asset
valuation method
-
independent audit
– std. reporting
formats under
development
issue papers and
determinations
public
limited
   - Tasmania min.3 max 5 years consultations, issue
papers, draft reports
OPEX: benchm.
CAPEX: DORC
method
intended use of
Australian
benchmarks
-
‘market benefits
test’ for inclusion of
CAPEX in rate-base
-
audited info in
specified format
and guidelines
price determine.
limited consulting
reports
no
   - Victoria 5 years several iterations yes proxy benchmarks reward and
penalty
yes, with efficiency
carry over to next
regulatory period
-
utility auditors,
standard reporting
format planned
issue/consultation
papers, draft
decisions
indirect
Canada
    - Ontario
3 years (current
regulatory period)
two-year
consultation period -
1st PBR period: min.
quality standards
2nd.: benchmark. of
collected data
2nd PBR period through price cap
mechanism
incentives for DSM in
the 2nd. rate period
standard format &
audited by the
regulator
consultation papers
& information -
Japan upon submission
of proposal for
price revision
- - - - - - - - -
 United States
  - California
     (SCE) 5 years several iterations yes yes yes, quality
standards
- - -
PBR guidelines,
applications,
decisions
-
Non -
OECD
Brazil 4 years at least 1
-
MCDA penalties
- -
standard format
reporting, audit by
the regulator
- research sponsorship
Chile 4-5 years yes separate standards penalties, revoking
license
yes - standard format,
company auditors
- -
Colombia 5 years at least 1 consult.
doc. 1 year prior to
application
benchm. total
controllable costs
international benchm.
of product & techn.
service in S
compensation to
customers
yes
-
standard format &
no formal auditing
no yes
India
 - Orissa
variable variable
-
performance
standards - - -
standard reporting
format, audited
utility accounts
- -
Abbreviations - D: distribution   T: transmission   S: supply  tbd: to be decided   w.: with   fr.: from   mkt.: market   SCE: Southern California Edison
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5.2.3 From Benchmarking to Price-Setting
The previous sections discussed the diversity of the benchmarking methods adopted by
regulators. This section outlines the differences in the regulators’ approach to translate
benchmarking results into X-factors and price-setting. In liberalised power sectors the
distribution function is often separated from supply or retailing. However, where there is no
separation of distribution and supply, the X-factor for the distribution function can be applied
to a rate base which excludes power purchase costs. Specific targeted incentive regulation
schemes can then be designed to promote efficiency in power purchasing. Tables 5 and 6
summarise the main features of this process for distribution and transmission utilities
respectively in selected countries.
As shown in Table 5, the Norwegian regulator uses a rather formalised approach involving a
linear conversion of the efficiency scores from DEA into efficiency requirements. Also, the
regulator uses the total controllable costs in benchmarking. These features may be explained
in the light of the large number of distribution utilities in the sector which makes an equitable
and consistent treatment of capital expenditures and X-factors of individual utilities rather
difficult. In the Netherlands, England and Wales, and New South Wales where there are fewer
utilities the regulators limit the scope of benchmarking to operating expenditures and treat
capital expenditures individually. In New South Wales with just 6 distribution utilities there is
no formalised procedure for conversion of efficiency scores into X-factors.
Chile represents an exception in this regard and as discussed previously the 35 utilities are
benchmarked against efficient model firms. In California, Performance Based Regulation
schemes are negotiated individually, the regulator uses rate of return regulation based on
profit sharing which does not require direct comparisons. This approach is also consistent
with the US legal environment which favours the use of utilities’ actual costs rather than that
of the most efficient technology and configuration available.18
Table 6 shows setting the X-factor for the central transmission grids in the Netherlands and
Norway the two countries in our sample which make their benchmarking process clear. The
Dutch regulator has used DEA and a large international sample of transmission utilities in
order to overcome the lack of comparators in the domestic power sector. In Norway, in
contrast to benchmarking of distribution utilities, the regulator has chosen a one-to-one
benchmarking relative to the Swedish transmission utility. This approach appears to a large
extent to be motivated by the view that the topography of the Statnett’s operating environment
is a crucial factor. The choice of the one-to-one benchmarking method of Value Chain
Method which recognises and allows for such differences also reflects this view.
The following section highlights three cases of price setting and regulation involving different
approaches to incentive regulation and benchmarking.
                                                       
18 See for example USCA (2000) for a ruling against the use of predictive pricing methodologies.
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Table 5: Benchmarking and incentive regulation of distribution utilities in selected countries (latest price review)
Country Benchmarking/regulation
method
Benchmarking
sample
Inputs and outputs From benchmarking to X-factor/reward
Great Britain
COLS analysis of OPEX
Revenue cap
14 RECs in Great
Britain
Input: OPEX
Output: Composite variable (50% no.
of customers, 25% electricity
distributed, 25% network length)
High-cost utilities must move 75% of the distance to
efficient frontier by 2001/02.
Netherlands
DEA: total controllable
costs
Revenue cap
19 Dutch utilities Input: OPEX
Output: units, peak demand high
voltage, peak demand low voltage,
network length, customers small,
customers large
Benchmarking analysis and analysis of OPEX. X=8 to -2
for individual companies. Assume all inefficiency for
companies below the maximum cap of 8 eliminated by
year 3 and a frontier shift of 2% per annum (some
companies could have been given up to X=17).
Norway
DEA: total controllable
costs
Revenue cap
Ca. 180 national
regional networks and
distribution utilities
Inputs: Capital (book value & repl.
cost), goods/services, losses, labour
Outputs: No. of customers, energy
deliv., length of lines & sea cables
Utility’s revenue cap for the 1998-2001 is reduced with
38.2% of the distance of utility’s eff. score from the
frontier: A 70% score means 11.5% rev. cap reduction or
3.5.% p.a. plus a 1.5% p.a. general eff. requirement.
Australia
   - New South
     Wales
DEA, SFA, TFP
Revenue cap
219  utilities – New
South Wales, other
Australia, New
Zealand, England &
Wales, and US
Inputs: Tot. O&M costs, transformer
cap, network size
Output: Electricity sold, no. of
customers, peak demand
Various forms of benchmarking are used but there is not
a single 'preferred' benchmarking technique or an
automatic translation of the results of quantitative
benchmarking analysis into the pricing determinations.
California
  - Southern
    California Edison
ROR-based profit sharing
Price cap
- -
P0=P1996 , X1997=1.2%, X1998=1.4%, X1999-2001=1.6%
-/+50 bps          -> shareholders receive all revs./losses
-/+50-300 bps   -> shareholders’ marg. share 25 to 100%
-/+300-600 bps -> sharehlders receive the gains/losses
>600 bps           -> triggers rate review
Chile
Efficient theoretical
reference / model firm
Yardstick regulation
-
Input: CAPEX, O&M, losses, and
customer related costs (low, medium,
and high voltage)
Output: Added distribution value
(ADV) for efficient  model firms
The estimated ADV (tariffs) for the model firms are
applied  to comparable real distribution utilities.
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Table 6: Benchmarking and incentive regulation of transmission utilities in selected countries
Country Benchmarking/regulation
method
Benchmarking sample Inputs and outputs From benchmarking to X-factor/reward
Netherlands
DEA
Revenue Cap
40 international utilities
(Sweden, Spain, UK,
Germany, US, Norway,
Finland)
Input:
Total Cost
Output: Units Transmitted (kWh);
Maximum Simultaneous Demand (MW);
+220kV Circuit Lines (km); and
Transformers (number)
Efficiency: 70% (2000)
X=4.2% including an assumed frontier shift of
2% p.a.
Norway
Value Chain Method
(VCM)
Revenue cap
One-to-one benchmarking
against the Swedish
transmission company -
Svenska Kraftnät
Input: CAPEX & OPEX costs (C) ,
Units/No. of cost drivers (net length,
transformers, connectors, stations)
multiplied by assigned weights (CD)
Output: C/CD  used to compare relative
efficiency
   &$3(; HII  
   23(; HII  
   7RWDO HII  
Utility-specific efficiency requirement =
2.36%p.a
1997-01. (same conversion method as for the
distribution utilities, some costs not included in
the revenue cap)
General efficiency requirement = 1.50%p.a.
1997-01
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5.3. Selected Benchmarking Cases
Southern California Edison (SCE)
The state of California began in 1990 to study replacement of the cost-of-service regulation
for gas and electric utilities with performance based regulation. Since 1993, the California
Public Utility Commission (CPUC) has adopted various PBR schemes for generation and
dispatch, base rate, gas procurement, and other operating revenues.19 The SCE PBR was
adopted in 1997 for transmission and distribution. In 1998, due to restructuring of the sector,
this PBR was limited to distribution only. The SCE PBR incorporates: (i) a rate-indexing or
RPI-X price cap formula, (ii) a revenue sharing mechanism, (iii) a cost of capital trigger
mechanism, (iv) a Z-factor, (v) service quality performance incentives, and (vi) a monitoring
and evaluation programme.
The initial rate (P0) was derived from 1996 tariffs and for subsequent years, the X-factor was
set at 1.2% (1997), 1.4% (1998), and 1.6% (1999-2001). The revenue sharing mechanism is
based on a benchmark return on equity (ROE) established by the Commission and three rate
bands surrounding the return. In the inner band (-/+50 basis points) the shareholders receive
all net revenue gains or losses. In the middle-band (-/+ 50-300), the shareholders marginal
share rises from 25 to 100%. In the outer-band (-/+300-600) shareholders receive the gains
and losses. Outside the 600 basis points, the PBR scheme is re-evaluated. The cost of capital
trigger mechanism makes provision for adjustment of the allowed return on equity based on
half the change in a AA bond index value. The authorised ROE for 1997 to 1999 has been
11.6 % while the actual return has been 13.55% in 1997 (adopted), 11.16% in 1998
(reported), and 11.31% in (1999-reported). The high ROE in 1997 resulted in a ratepayer
revenue share of $40.6 million or 6.7% and 3.8% of the utility’s total net and operating
income respectively. The Z-factor makes allowance for costs incurred due to extraodrdinary
events such that are beyond the control of the utility’s management such as changes in tax
laws and natural disasters.
The service quality incentives comprise service reliability, customer satisfaction, and
employee health and safety. Service reliability comprises outage duration and outage
frequency benchmarks. The outage duration benchmark is 59 minutes average customer
outage in 1997 and declines by 2 minutes in subsequent years. A dead-band of 6 minutes
surrounds the benchmark. No penalty is payable if the utility achieves an average of 55
minutes for the 1997-2001 period. The reward or penalty is $1 million per minute for two-
year averages with an upper limit of $18 million for outage and frequency. The frequency
benchmark is 10,900 annual interruptions with $1 million reward or penalty for each 183
interruptions.
Customer satisfaction is measured by independent surveys and the satisfaction benchmark is
64%. The main reward and penalty is $2 million for each percentage below or above a 3%
dead-band. The employee health and safety benchmark in brief is a ratio index of the number
of accidents and illnesses. The benchmark value is 13 with a dead-band of 0.3 and $555,000
                                                       
19 See CPUC (2000) for reviews of this and other PBR cases adopted in California.
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reward or penalty for 0.1 deviation increments beyond the band. The monitoring and
evaluation programme includes procedures such as change of prices and cost of capital as
well as revenue sharing and performance results.
Norway
The Norwegian power sector liberalisation began in 1991 as one of the first market-oriented
attempts to reform the sector. The reform involved restructuring of the state-owned utility
Statkraft, unbundling of services, and introduction of competition into electricity generation
and supply. Unlike the England & Wales model, the Norwegian reform did not affect the
ownership structure of the sector which is predominantly state, municipality, and county-
owned.
Until 1996, the transmission and distribution activities were subject to cost of service
regulation. Since 1997, an incentive-based revenue cap regulation was adopted for the central
transmission grid, 40-50 regional transmission utilities, and ca. 200 distribution utilities. The
central grid is owned by the state-owned company Statnett while the regional transmission
and distribution utilities are owned by municipalities and counties. The utility profits are the
difference between the revenue cap and actual costs and can vary in the range of +/-7%
around the normal rate of return (currently 8.3%). The length of the current regulatory period
is 5 years. The revenue cap for the initial year is shown in Equation (9).
(9) Initial revenue cap = Expected network loss * Expected spot price +
Revenue cap before network losses
The revenue cap before network loss was based on average costs in 1994 and 1995. Also, the
expected network loss is equal to average physical loss in 1994 and 1995. The initial revenue
cap is then adjusted using Consumer Price Index, average spot price on the Nordic Power
Exchange (Nord Pool), and 50% of the expected percentage increase in supply growth. The
revenue cap is then further adjusted using an efficiency factor X that comprises a ‘general’
and a ‘utility-specific’ component.
The utility specific X-factor is calculated from DEA analysis of the distribution utilities while
for Statnett the X-factor is calculated from Value Chain Method and comparison with the
Swedish utility Svenska Kraftnät (see Magnus and Midttun 2000). From 2001 the revenue
caps will be adjusted for quality of supply. The amount of reward or penalty equals the
increase or decrease in the cost of interruptions to customers.
In 1997, a general efficiency requirement of 2% applied to all utilities and no utility-specific
X-requirement. In 1998, the general X-factor was set at 1.5% while the weighted average of
utility-specific X-factors was 0.6%. The corresponding figures from 1999 to 2001 are 1.5 and
1.1% respectively. In 1999, the total revenue cap for the utilities amounted to 14,360 million
NKr.20 In comparison, the total efficiency improvement requirement for the same year was
370 million NKr. The utility-specific efficient requirement amounted to 157 million NKr, of
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
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which 70 million NKr applied to distribution utilities and 87 million NKr to regional
networks.
Great Britain
The power sector reform in Great Britain began in 1990. The reform has involved
restructuring of the industry, introduction of competition into generation and supply, and
large-scale privatisation. The regional distribution utilities in England and Wales, which
jointly owned the national transmission grid, were privatised in 1990 followed by most of
generation capacity in 1991.21 The regulated segments of the sector are the transmission grid
National Grid Company (NGC), and distribution utilities. In addition, the domestic supply
activities of the distribution utilities is subject to price cap regulation.
Some form of benchmarking is used in regulation of all regulation activities. The
benchmarking of transmission grid for the current 4-year price control period (1997-01)
involve TFP, DEA, and an international survey of 15 transmission utilities (OFFER 1996).22
In setting the price caps for domestic supplies the regulator has used comparison and
benchmarking of total operating supply costs. There is no regulation of independent suppliers
(OFGEM ,1999c).
In regulation of the distribution utilities, the regulator considers the operating costs, value of
existing assets, cost of capital, need for new investments, expected productivity growth, and
competition conditions in setting the revenue caps (OFGEM, 1999). The regulator uses a high
level benchmarking of total OPEX as well as an activity level benchmarking of specific types
of operating costs such as engineering, information technology, and human resources. In
addition, the regulator has used benchmarking of capital expenditures for average replacement
costs across the companies for a particular asset age profile.
In setting the revenue caps for individual distribution utilities, the present value of the total
revenue cap for the duration of the rate period is calculated. The revenue cap for each year is
then determined based on utility-specific initial price levels P0 and X-factors which are set
simultaneously. There is therefore an infinite number of possible combinations of P0 and X-
factor. The regulatory period for distribution utilities is 5 years. For each period, prices for the
initial year(s) P0 vary across the utilities while they share the same X-factors. For example, for
the rate period 1995/6-1999/00, the X-factors for 1996/97 and 1997/98 averaged 14 and
11.5% respectively and 3% p.a. for the 1997/98-1999/00 period. Similarly, for the current
period 2000/01-2004/05, the average X-factor for the initial year 2000/01 is 23.4% (some of
which accounts for transfers to the supply business) and 3% p.a. for the 2001/02-2004/05
period.
The price control review for the regulatory period 1995-2000 assume that the less cost
efficient distribution utilities “move three quarters of the way to the efficient frontier by
2001/02 and retain that position relative to the frontier” (OFGEM, 1999a, p.21). Also, the
                                                       
21 The 2 Scottish public electricity suppliers were also privatised in 1990 but remained as vertically integrated
companies.
22 The next price control period is extended to 5 years (2001-06).
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three utilities that are closest to the efficient frontier were rewarded with 1% of their price
control revenue.
There have also been several incentive schemes that involve adjustments to price control
revenues in respect of performance in the previous regulatory period. For the first year of the
current rate period for distribution (2000-01), these 'within the range adjustments' could
potentially amount to up to +2.0/-2.25% of the revenue. The actual maximum revenue
adjustments however amounted to -1.25%. For example, efficiency in capital expenditure
could be rewarded with up to +/-1% of the revenue. In addition, reward and penalty schemes
were tied to customer satisfaction, quality of supply, energy efficiency, and accuracy of
forecasts (penalty only) (OFGEM, 1999a; OFGEM, 1999b). From 2002 to 2005 quality of
supply is due to be annually benchmarked using utility-specific quality targets that are tied to
financial rewards and penalties. The maximum amount of revenue which will then be exposed
to 'within the range adjustments' will be +/-2% p.a.
6. Conclusions
In closing we summarise the international experience to date from countries that have used
benchmarking in incentive regulation. We then outline the main outstanding issues associated
with the use of benchmarking and draw some lessons for best-practice implementation by
regulators.
The incentive regulation and benchmarking in most countries is in the first or second
regulatory period. Our survey showed that a number of regulators are using or considering
benchmarking in the regulatory process. Most reforms have involved establishing
independent regulatory authorities. New regulators seem to be less bounded by path
dependency of institutional constraints to adopt new regulatory tools such as benchmarking.
Therefore, benchmarking is likely to become more common as more countries implement
reforms.
The time lag between implementation of reforms and establishing new regulatory agencies
and adoption of benchmarking appears to be decreasing. As the number of regulators
increases, there is more scope for exchange of experience with regulators in other industries
and countries. Most incentive regulations use price and revenue caps. As we saw, the
Southern California Edison’s PBR is essentially a price cap regulation with profit sharing.
Sharing mechanisms are uncommon although the UK also uses such a scheme for new
investments. We did not find benchmarking cases with explicit treatment of environmental
impacts. There is however a desire in the United States for the inclusion of DSM programmes
in PBRs.
Further, we found that benchmarking is mostly practised in countries with well-developed
upstream competition, spot market, and a high degree of market liberalisation. Finally, to the
extent that consultation between the regulator and industry and high degree of published
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information are regarded as indicators for transparency of the regulatory process, most
benchmarking countries exhibit such transparancy.
Outstanding Issues
Although a number of regulators have used benchmarking and more are likely to do so, some
theoretical issues are still open to debate. Frontier approaches are susceptible to shocks and
errors in data. This is especially the case when cross-sectional data is used and there is no
allowance for errors. In order to minimise problems due to data errors there should be very
careful handling of data accuracy. For example, Norway and UK have made considerable
effort to improve data standardisation and accuracy.
Firm specific efficiency scores are sensitive to the specification and assignment of the
outputs, inputs and environmental variables. This raises questions as to the robustness and
accuracy of calculated X-factors based on unstable rankings. The UK regulator has adopted a
simple regression model with one dependent (cost) and one independent variable (composite
output) to increase data robustness while Norway, perhaps due to a large sample size, has
been able to adopt a more elaborate DEA model.
A problem with frontier methods is that it is not clear whether the frontier provides a valid
comparator even in the absence of data errors and shocks. For instance in DEA models that
assume constant returns to scale, a firm may be compared to a part of the frontier defined by
firms of radically different scale. To reduce these problems some regulators such as in the UK
just use national samples in benchmarking.
Separate analysis of capital and operating costs encourages intermediation between these cost
categories. For example, firms may attempt to argue for higher capital costs to reduce
operating costs. While benchmarking should ideally apply to total costs, this is difficult given
the heterogeneous nature of capital. As a result, regulators in the UK and Norway have
struggled with how to handle the possibility of intermediation. International comparisons are
often restricted to comparison of operating costs because of the heterogeneity of capital but
this may limit their applicability.
The calculation of the likely future rate of movement of the frontier is problematic. Measures
of past productivity growth usually include both frontier shift effects and movements towards
the frontier. However, the problem of estimating this is minimised if firms are compared to
world best practice as, the range of variation in estimates of world best practice frontier shifts
(given international benchmarking) is small (1-2% p.a.).
Once efficiency scores are calculated the crucial assumption in deciding the X-factors is the
rate at which efficiency gaps can be closed. Therefore, national regulators will need to make
allowance both for this and for in-country heterogeneity. In international comparisons, firms
in some countries will be able to close the gap faster than others.
A major reservation against assigning firm specific X-factors has been that the cost saving
incentives are blunted if companies are not allowed to retain efficiency savings beyond the
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next price review. Benchmarking may result in firms having to run to stand still and hence
there may be strong incentives to subvert the regulatory process.
International benchmarking raises particular difficulties. The most notable issue is that of
comparability and quality of data which may only be improved in time and requires co-
operation among the regulators. In addition, when comparing monetary units the correct
handling of currency exchange rates is of particular importance. The relative differences in
input prices (e.g. wage rates, taxes, and rates of return on capital) beyond the control of the
firm may have to be taken into consideration.
Finally, design and implementation of incentive regulation schemes in developing countries
may have to take certain political issues and concerns into consideration. In some Latin
American countries, the governments, in order to guarantee regulatory commitment and to the
secure success of privatisation programmes, have directly negotiated the terms (e.g. price
caps) of the initial post privatisation rate periods with utilities and thus limited the regulators’
discretion. Another concern is that of price subsidies in place which often serve social and
political objectives. In other countries, it is important to maintain national uniform final
electricity prices.
Lessons for Best Practice Implementation
Based on the results of the survey and the above theoretical and empirical concerns we can
draw some lessons for implementation of benchmarking in regulation.
The regulators should use cost-linked benchmarking to calculate X-factors in the early period
following power sector reforms. Benchmarking exercises should be viewed as just a
transitional regime until competition can be introduced into the sector or international best
practice arrives.
International benchmarking is more useful for comparison of transmission utilities as there is
often a lack of domestic comparators. In addition, countries with a small number of
distribution firms can benefit from international comparisons. Also, international
benchmarking is generally advantageous in the case of non-US firms, as these are likely to be
behind the frontier.
It is important that the regulators collect national and international data through formal co-
operation and exchange. New regulators need to pay ample attention to developing good data
collection and reporting systems. A precondition for international comparisons is to focus on
the improving the quality of data collection process, auditing, and standardisation within and
across countries.
The issue of choosing the most appropriate benchmarking methods and model specification
can not be settled on theoretical grounds. Therefore, benchmarking should not be confined to
a particular technique. In each case, regulators should use the latest techniques such as DEA,
COLS, SFA, and partial benchmarking as well as sensitivity analysis to examine the
consistency of results and robustness of the rank orders.
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The regulator should also use benchmarking in order to estimate the scope for efficiency
improvement subject to error bounds. In keeping with transparency criteria for regulatory
governance regulators should publish data, method, and results and as an information
revelation device and invite comments and solicit more information.
Further, benchmarking methods and their raw results should not be regarded as replacements
to decision-makers and their judgements. Rather, the primary function of benchmarking
methods is to serve as decision-aid tools that can help decision-makers overcome bounded
rationality in a complex decision environment. Therefore, as in any area of public policy,
regulatory decisions should ultimately be based on decision-makers’ judgements and
discretion.
Finally, it is important that the regulator has full discretion with regard to several aspects of
the data, models, and methods used in benchmarking. The regulator should be free to decide
specification of the important factors for national utilities and in weighting the results from
different techniques. The regulator should exercise discretion through assessing the scope for
future frontier shift, predicting the rate of demand growth and crucially in the estimation of
the rate at which efficiency gaps should and can be closed. Benchmarking methods are an
important decision-aid. However, they do not mean that regulators can not or should not use
their informed judgment in setting prices and performance targets.
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